Sixty
years ago the psychoanalyst Erik Erikson gave a talk in India on the Golden
Rule, a formulation that occurs, with some variation, in all the major
religions. Judaism: “What is hateful to yourself, do not do to you fellow man.”
Islam: “No one of you is a believer until he desires for his brother what he
desires for himself.” Christianity: “Do unto others as you would have them do
unto you.” Erikson’s theme was the creative potential of mutuality—between spouses,
parents and children, doctors and patients, teachers and pupils, even between
nations. Mutuality, Erikson asserted, is a relationship in which partners
depend upon each other for the enhancement of their respective strengths. The curiosity of a student elicits from
the teacher the skills for transmitting the excitement of learning in a way
that benefits both teacher and student.
In
the case of nations, fear of Hobbesian chaos if leaders relax their futile race
toward military superiority makes it difficult to encourage mutuality. Ruthless
power relations turn the lifegiving spirit of mutuality on its head: do not
even think of trying to destroy me because if you do I will destroy you. This
paranoia rationalizes the unabated manufacture of ever more destructive weaponry,
irrespective of sensible policy goals, by ever more powerful corporations. As
the vulgarism derived from the Golden Rule puts it, those with the gold make
the rules. The ersatz American idea of mutuality (adore us, obey us, give us
your oil) has often resulted in tragedy—or tragic farce, viz. Mr. Cheney
asserting recently that given the chance to do it all over, he wouldn’t change
a thing.
Is
there anything that we have learned about the context of international
relations in the years since Erikson gave his talk that might make his paradigm
of mutuality not only more relevant but also more realistic? Can the Golden Rule become more
persuasive than gold?
First,
establishment strategists schooled in pitiless power politics like Henry
Kissinger have come to the reluctant conclusion that nuclear weapons cannot
serve as a useful tool for furthering anyone’s national interest. Kissinger’s boss Richard Nixon wanted
to use them against North Vietnam, but was dissuaded lest other nuclear powers
be drawn in. Fortunately we were
mature enough to accept defeat rather than suicidal escalation, and that
restraint has continued. It may be a sign that we are gradually maturing beyond
the folly of war altogether that most American wars since Vietnam, since Korea
in fact, have been inconclusive stalemates.
When
American, Israeli and Iranian diplomats, or their proxies, sit down to talk, do
they simply threaten each other? Or do they hypothesize together what will
inevitably occur down the time-stream if they fail to establish the basic trust
upon which mutuality can be built? Is it possible for them to help each other
see the possibility of shared survival goals despite the chasm of divergent
motives and stories? Can they acknowledge how other nations have already gone
through the futile process of arming themselves to the point of being able to
pound each other’s rubble, only to arrive, a few months before Erikson’s long-ago
talk, at the Cuban Missile Crisis? Do they share with each other the reality
that the detonation of only a few nuclear weapons has the potential to cause
nuclear winter, endangering not just specific parties to conflict but the
planet as a whole?
The
second basis for mutuality even between enemies, following upon the realization
that anything else leads to nuclear extinction, is the model of mutuality found
in nature, pressed upon us by all the ecological revelations and challenges
that have arisen since Erikson spoke. Humans exist only through their mutual
relationship with the air they breathe and the food they consume, with the sun
that fuels photosynthesis, ocean currents, wind and rain. Mutuality, whether or
not we decide to make it our conscious goal, is our essential condition.
Adversaries
have the option to build mutuality upon these two principles: first, war in the
nuclear age solves nothing and has become obsolete, and second, at every level
from the personal to the international, we know now how deeply interdependent
and interrelated all humans are with each other and their life-support system.
These two realities have come down upon us a thousand fold since Erikson
posited mutuality as an ethical touchstone, renewing and deepening the implications
of the universal Golden Rule. These realities can help guide contemporary
diplomats from all nations through the dilemmas that raw military power cannot
address. Threats become less effective than initiating people-to-people
exchanges or giving the “enemy” fully-equipped hospitals, gestures of good will
that lessen fear and build relationship.
Such initiatives are exponentially lower in price than war itself. As Erikson
put it:
Nations today are by definition units of different
stages of political, technological and economic transformation . . . insofar as
a nation thinks of itself as a collective individual, then, it may well learn
to visualize its task as that of maintaining mutuality in international
relations. For the only alternative to armed competition seems to be the effort
to activate in the historical partner
what will strengthen him in his historical development even as it strengthen
the actor in his own development—toward a common future identity.
No comments:
Post a Comment