Mark
Helprin’s 2012 novel, 'In Sunlight and in Shadow', tries to articulate
as noble as possible a justification for the tragic violence of war. The
novel is set just after World War II, so it is not surprising that the
rationale is based in the Churchillian mind-set of the campaign to
defeat Hitler. In the novel, an older veteran argues: “How many millions
have to die, Harry, before we stop worrying about unintended
consequences?”
Harry,
a younger vet, responds: “What if all nations decided to kill off what
in their eyes was mortally dangerous leadership? It would become a
Hobbesian world.”
“The
world just lost 50 million dead. Is that Hobbesian enough? Politeness
can be a form of collaboration, or suicide . . .You have to play it by
ear, as you know, as you must know, having fought your way through
Sicily, France, Holland and Germany, your responsibility is not to be
morally pristine, but to preserve the maximum number of innocent lives.
How many men have you killed?
“Too many.”
“Yes,
and probably most of them were as innocent as you. . . . You know that,
and yet you had to kill them, and you did, because all in all, in the
gross and scope of it, scores of millions are alive now who would not
have been, or who would have been enslaved, had Germany not been
defeated. Children by the millions, Harry, they are the reason you
killed men. Now you are forever morally impure, but Harry, if only by
the weight of the flesh and blood in the balance, you’re purer than
those who refused.”
This
interchange strikes home because it is just how we might imagine our
nobly impure presidents and generals think, conveying a sense of what
allows them to sleep at night as our drones sleeplessly patrol—allows
them to shed tears for children in Newtown but not for those in the
dusty, half-starving villages of Afghanistan or Yemen. Prevention
rationalizes preemption, and its inevitable collateral damage.
Even
the difference between the civilian-encompassing firestorms of Dresden
and the surgical precision of modern destruction fails to quiet our
unease. Nor, surely, does the technological line of progress that says
we can deploy a drone to assassinate, so why not, even if we fray the tenuous bonds of law and moral decency.
Nobly
impure intentions enforced by drones are no longer enough. If they
were, Afghanistan would not be the war-weary, corrupt, drug-saturated
place it has become today, and we would not be seeing so many suicides
among our vets. Our campaigns to bring democracy to Vietnam, or to
preempt a potential Hitler in Iraq, did not turn out so nobly.
The
doubts troubling Helprin’s young veteran have gradually magnified
between 1945 and the present to the point where we can no longer avoid
seeing our complicity in the Hobbesian totality. Our own carbon
footprint helps the sea rise over low-lying Pacific atolls, or floods
impoverished Bangladeshis. It is our own country that possesses the most
nuclear weapons and sells the most conventional weapons and has the
biggest military budget and occupies the most bases overseas.
The
unintended consequences that the older veteran in Helprin’s novel might
wish to disregard for the sake of his vision of the greater good can no
longer be set aside as worth the price of war. Instead, we have become
disagreeably familiar with blowback, where the “solution” makes the
problem worse—as seen over decades of Western interference in Iran and
Iraq, or Soviet and American meddling in Afghanistan. The blowback from
targeted assassinations is already occurring as innocents are killed,
resentments mount, and fresh recruits offer themselves for further
mayhem.
And
as more and more nations possess nuclear weapons, any modern conflict,
even one provoked by stateless entities, could lead, as it almost did
lead in 1962, to global apocalypse. Above the endless cycle of violence
loom ultimate unintended consequences, like nuclear winter—the mother of
all blowbacks.
The answer is not merely “soft power,” which still involves, by gentler means than war, co-opting others to do what we want.
One possible model, one that could bring some balance into our
overwhelmingly militaristic foreign policy, might be called “good
power.” Rotary International provides a model of what this power for
good might look like. Rotary has 32,000 clubs in 200 countries. It’s
based in people-to-people relationships. It sets high goals and plods
stubbornly toward them, like their worldwide and almost achieved
anti-polio initiative. It makes friends and elicits the sincere
gratitude of those to whom it provides crucial aid. Why is it not
“realistic” to deemphasize our ironclad military fist in favor of a
helping hand, with the understanding that an increase in the security of
any nation increases our own?